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ABSTRACT 
 
Naïve international diversification has been fundamental to portfolio management over the past 30 
years, but the benefits appear to be significantly diminished following the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. Using monthly return data covering the period from 1970 through 2004, we found rising 
correlations between U.S. and international equity markets exceeding 0.85 since July 1997. Even the 
return correlation of emerging countries recently has reached almost 0.80. We also found a 
significant reduction in the variance of the international return correlation after the financial crisis. 
Portfolio managers should not expect to receive the same benefits from international portfolio 
diversification as that obtained prior to the Asian financial crisis.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ortfolio diversification can be described simply as an investment strategy that seeks to combine assets 
in a portfolio with returns that are less than perfectly positively correlated in an effort to lower 
portfolio risk without sacrificing return. Naive diversification goes further by suggesting a strategy 
whereby a portfolio manager invests randomly in a number of different assets with the expectation that the variance of 
the expected return on the portfolio is lowered. Following the seminal work of Markowitz (1952), Grubel (l968) 
applied the concepts of modern portfolio theory to international investing and a number of subsequent empirical 
studies have confirmed the advantages of naïve international portfolio diversification. Levy and Sarnat (1970), 
Lessard (1973), Solnik (1974), and others found that the benefits of internationally diversified portfolios stem from 
the fact that the co-movements between different national equity markets have been relatively low with reported 
correlations of about 0.40. While most research focused on developed countries, Kasa (1994) studied emerging market 
returns and reported much more volatility than developed markets and lower correlations of about 0.20 with U.S. 
market returns.   
 
Naïve international diversification has been a fundamental portfolio management strategy over the past 30 
years. However, is the concept still valid following the globalization trend that began after the Asian financial crisis? 
If there has been an increased correlation between the returns of world stock markets, wouldn’t this sharply lower the 
diversifying properties of international equities? It is the purpose of this study to address this question by investigating 
the recent relationship between U.S. and international stock market returns and to determine if the Asian crisis was a 
triggering event that resulted in increased equity correlation. The logic behind the question is related to the common 
perception that developed and emerging markets have been moving more in parallel with the U.S. stock market since 
the beginning of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
 
While earlier studies found a low degree of correlation across international stock markets, it has been 
reported recently that this relationship has been changing. King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994) found greater 
integration of world stock market returns in the period following the U.S. stock market crash of 1987. Campbell 
(1995) reported on the low correlation between returns in emerging and developed country stock markets and implied 
that the investors would benefit from diversification in emerging country markets. He also noted that the correlation 
between the emerging market returns appeared to be increasing relative to the U.S. market over time. Siegel (2002) 
P 
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reported a significant increase in the correlations between world equity returns after the mid-1990s. He showed stock 
return correlation coefficients between the United States and the developed countries in Europe, Australia, and the Far 
East have risen from about 0.40 in the 1970s to almost 0.80 in the late 1990s. Brooks and Del Negro (2004) found 
further evidence that the return relationship between U.S. and world equity markets has grown significantly stronger 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s with correlations of almost 0.85. More recently, Statman and Scheid (2005) found 
the correlation coefficient between U.S. and international stocks increased to 0.86 by 2003. 
  
There are several possible explanations for the apparent rise in international equity market correlation. 
Clearly, the globalization of financial markets is a major factor with world economies becoming more integrated due 
to the opening of formerly closed economies and the exchange cross-listing of many equity securities. It also is 
possible that in integrated international equity markets, the actions of arbitrageurs have acted to ensure that stocks 
with similar risk are priced to offer the same return. Additionally, there is improved policy coordination across 
countries with better and more rapid investment information flows. Finally, the country in which a firm is 
headquartered apparently has become less important to investors, suggesting a decline in investors’ “home bias” 
regarding their portfolio holdings; a finding that was reported by Tesar and Werner (1995) and Lewis (1999). Siegel 
suggests that it is quite likely that the globalization of equity trading will continue to cause world markets to move 
more synchronously than in the past. Brooks and Del Negro observed a similar increase in international correlation 
since the mid-1990s; however, they suggest that some of the rise may be due to temporary factors that resulted from 
unique global and country-specific shocks. 
 
The Asian financial crisis, a strong global shock that started in the summer of 1997 in Thailand, adversely 
affected the currencies and stock markets of many Asian countries. Besides Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea 
were deeply affected by the crisis, while Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines were adversely impacted to a 
lesser degree. The Pacific Rim countries of Japan, China, Taiwan, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia were only 
minimally affected by the Asian financial crisis. Like the other “Asian tiger” countries, Thailand enjoyed massive 
foreign capital investment inflows in the early 1990s. The Thai economy grew at an average annual rate of almost 
10% during the period. Following a large sell-off of the Thai baht in 1996 by George Soros’ hedge fund and lower 
returns on real asset investments, the Thai stock market and currency dropped by over 50% in the summer of 1997 
following the move to a floating currency, which had been previously pegged to the U.S. dollar. Thailand’s chronic 
trade and government deficits, along with rising inflationary pressures, led to a loss of investor confidence and 
resulted in a run on the country’s financial markets. Even with substantial International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
intervention, the currencies and stock markets of the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea plunged in value shortly 
after the Thailand collapse in 1997.  
 
The Asian financial crisis has had a long-term effect on international financial markets. After 1997, creditors 
and investors in the U.S. and Europe came to the realization that the Asian economies could not grow as fast as they 
had in the early 1990s. This resulted in an extremely cautious approach to Asian foreign investment. The other 
important fallout of the Asian crisis was the demise of fixed exchange rates as a system of international monetary 
exchange. Floating currencies and strict IMF lending restrictions became the norm in most Asian countries after 1997. 
This trend has brought more integration of the world’s economies and is likely responsible for the observed increase 
in international equity market correlation. 
 
It is the purpose of this study to investigate the recent relationship between U.S. and international stocks 
market returns before and after the Asian financial crisis. If there has been an increase in the long-term correlation 
between U.S. and foreign stock market returns after the crisis, this would sharply lower the diversifying properties of 
international equities and remove most of the benefits of naïve international stock diversification.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this paper, we investigate the return relationships between U.S. equities and a variety of international 
equity indices and individual country stock market indices from 1970 through 2004. The international equities 
examined include both developed and emerging market countries. Although return relationships are examined over 
more than thirty years, our focus is on the nature of the relationships following July 1997 when the Thai baht was 
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significantly devalued and the Asian crisis began. This is consistent with the general perception of the crisis and the 
methodology used in related studies, such as Olienyk, Schweback, and Zumwalt (2000). 
  
It is hypothesized that the return relationships between U.S. and international equity indices increased 
following the Asian financial crisis in July 1997. To capture this phenomenon, two statistical tests were employed: the 
t-test for comparing mean return correlations and time series relations, and the F-test for comparing the pre- and post-
crisis correlation variances. 
 
The data for the study, which covered the period from January 1970 through December 2004, was obtained 
from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI).  The widely utilized MSCI international equity benchmarks are 
maintained across 23 developed and 27 emerging markets.  The value-weighted MSCI benchmarks are based on 
monthly capital appreciation – dividends are not included in the indices.  In addition to various developed and 
emerging country indices, the following regional indices were included in the study: 
 
 The MSCI World Index ex US, a market capitalization index including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
 The MSCI EAFE Index (Europe, Australasia, Far East) consisting of 21 developed market country indices. 
 The MSCI Europe Index consisting of the developed market country indices in Europe. 
 The MSCI Pacific Index consisting of the following five developed market countries including Australia, 
Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore. 
 The MSCI US Index represents the universe of companies in the United States equity market, including 
large, mid, small and micro cap companies. 
 The MSCI Emerging Markets Index, a market capitalization index designed to measure equity market 
performance in the global emerging markets, consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela. The data for the 
EM index began in 1988 and in the 1990s several other emerging countries were added to the index. 
 The MSCI Emerging Markets Asia Index includes China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.  
 The MSCI Emerging Markets Europe Index includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia.   
 
Monthly rates of return were calculated and correlation coefficients were computed over 6-month non-
overlapping periods for U.S. and other stock market returns. Compound mean returns and standard deviations were 
calculated for all indices over the various time periods studied. The degree of asynchronous movements of returns 
between the U.S. and international indices was measured by the correlation coefficient. Based on modern portfolio 
theory it is well known that as the correlation coefficient between the U.S. and international indices increases, the 
gains from naïve portfolio diversification are mitigated. As stated previously, it is the purpose of this research to 
investigate the recent relationship between U.S. and international stocks market returns to determine if there has been 
increased equity correlation and, if so, whether the Asian financial crisis was the triggering event.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Table 1 presents the compound annual returns and standard deviations for the developed regions and major 
countries for the period 1970-2004 and for the pre- and post-Asian financial crisis time periods. The returns are 
computed in U.S. dollars. Overall, world mean annual returns of the developed countries declined following the Asian 
financial crisis, except for Australia. Hong Kong and Japan experienced the most extreme return difference across 
sub-periods with average annual returns lower by almost 20% and 15%, respectively. The U.S. and European stock 
markets were also lower in the post-financial crisis period, but not by statistically significant levels. The standard 
deviations of the returns were not statistically different across the two sub-periods studied.  
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Table 1: Compound Annual Dollar Returns Of Developed World Stock Markets, 1970-2004 (Std. Deviations) 
Region or Country 1970 - 2004 1970 – June 1997 July 1997 - 2004 
World ex US 7.75%  
(16.80%) 
9.39%  
(16.92%) 
1.76% ** 
(16.22%) 
EAFE 7.72%  
(16.70%) 
9.39%  
(16.83%) 
1.69% ** 
(16.10%) 
Europe 7.44%  
(16.75%) 
8.34%  
(16.52%) 
4.20% 
 (17.53%) 
Pacific 8.50%  
(20.87%) 
11.41%  
(21.14%) 
-2.09% *** 
(19.53%) 
U.S. 6.88%  
(15.47%) 
7.79%  
(15.05%) 
3.56% 
 (16.87%) 
United Kingdom 7.03% 
 (22.87%) 
8.41%  
(24.62%) 
2.00% * 
 (14.64%) 
Germany 7.27% 
 (21.41%) 
8.63%  
(20.16%) 
2.36% 
 (25.39%) 
France 7.59%  
(22.62%) 
7.89%  
(23.21%) 
6.48% 
 (20.32%) 
Hong Kong 12.31%  
(37.42%) 
16.62% 
 (39.07%) 
-3.15% *** 
(30.12%) 
Japan 9.10%  
(22.46%) 
12.50% 
 (22.79%) 
-3.18% *** 
(20.80%) 
Australia 4.93%  
(24.13%) 
4.69%  
(25.41%) 
5.83%  
(18.76%) 
  Significance of mean difference across sub-periods (* p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001). 
 
 
The term "emerging markets" was coined by the World Bank in the early 1980s. Emerging market countries 
typically are in the process of industrialization and have lower gross national product per capita than more developed 
countries. Of the 130 countries generally considered to be emerging market countries, 27 have stock market indices 
monitored by Morgan Stanley Capital International. Emerging markets often experience periods of highly volatile 
returns especially surrounding major events. This was especially true following the 1997 Asian financial market 
contagion and the 1998 Russian ruble devaluation and debt default.  
 
Table 2 presents the compound annual returns and standard deviations for emerging market regions and 
selected countries for the period beginning in 1988, as well as the pre- and post-Asian financial crisis time periods. 
While the emerging market index for Europe was significantly higher in the post-crisis period than for Asia, it should 
be noted that the majority of the European emerging countries were added after 1992 and a pre-crisis comparison to 
other emerging market returns should be done with caution. The returns are computed in U.S. dollars. As expected, 
the Asian emerging market region and individual Asian countries had lower returns in the post-financial crisis period, 
except for South Korea.  As previously observed by other researchers, the return volatility of emerging markets was 
much greater than the standard deviations computed for the returns of developed countries. In addition, all standard 
deviations for emerging Asian countries were higher in the post-financial crisis period, except Taiwan.  
 
Figure 1 shows the growth of $100 invested in equities in the U.S. and the four international regional indices 
of developed markets over the entire study period. While the long-term returns are nearly identical at the end of 2004, 
the individual regional returns fluctuated significantly during the 1980s and early 1990s, especially the returns of the 
Pacific index which were dominated by the large fluctuations experienced by Japan and Hong Kong. 
 
Figure 2 shows the growth of $100 invested in equities in the U.S. and the three international emerging 
market indices over the 1988-2004 period. The U.S. and world emerging market indices outperformed the European 
and Asian emerging markets during this 17 year period. 
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Table 2: Compound Annual Dollar Returns Of Emerging World Stock Markets, 1988-2004 (Std. Deviations) 
Region or Country 1988 - 2004 1988 – June 1997 July 1997 - 2004 
World Emerging Markets 9.94%  
(23.07%) 
18.16%  
(20.45%) 
-0.28% *** 
(25.72%) 
Emerging Markets - Asia 5.01%  
(25.13%) 
12.96%  
(20.98%) 
-4.87% *** 
(29.32%) 
Emerging Markets -Europe 7.15%  
(26.57%) 
3.28%  
(29.92%) 
11.69% * 
 (30.49%) 
Indonesia 5.35%  
(55.40%) 
20.22%  
(50.00%) 
-13.03% ** 
(61.28%) 
Malaysia 4.72%  
(32.32%) 
14.11%  
(23.19%) 
-6.94% ** 
(40.84%) 
Philippines 2.73%  
(34.11%) 
18.11%  
(30.01%) 
-16.26% *** 
(38.03%) 
South Korea 4.31%  
(40.72%) 
1.70%  
(27.49%) 
7.59%  
(52.71%) 
Taiwan 4.76%  
(40.35%) 
14.70%  
(44.67%) 
-7.58% ** 
(33.71%) 
Thailand 3.34%  
(41.64%) 
7.83%  
(31.01%) 
-2.27% 
(51.97%) 
Turkey 7.10%  
(43.49%) 
3.48%  
(55.95%) 
11.33% 
(39.62%) 
Country 1993-2004 1993 – June 1997 July 1997 - 2004 
China -11.53%  
(39.55%) 
-4.67% 
 (31.85%) 
-15.58%  
(43.47%) 
India 5.34%  
(29.14%) 
5.80%  
(28.42%) 
5.06%  
(29.56%) 
Poland 18.24%  
(216.42%) 
54.52%  
(275.79%) 
3.44% 
(30.52%) 
Country 1995-2004 1995 – June 1997 July 1997 - 2004 
Czech Republic 11.38%  
(33.27%) 
0.65%  
(35.21%) 
14.24% * 
(34.59%) 
Russia 16.81%  
(29.12%) 
34.45%  
(55.79%) 
12.98% 
(30.52%) 
   Significance of mean difference across sub-periods (* p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001). 
 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficient of the returns for the U.S. and various international and country 
equity indices over the entire study period and the two sub-periods. All return correlations were found to be higher in 
the post-Asian financial crisis period and all standard deviations, except for China, were found to be lower. As shown 
in the table, most return correlations were about double the average pre-crisis levels, including the emerging European 
markets. The variation of the correlations of the regional indices for the developed and emerging countries were 
statistically lower in the post-crisis period than in the previous period and all F-tests of difference between variances 
were found to be significant (p<.05).  
 
As a graphical representation of general trends, Figure 3 shows the 24-month moving average correlation 
trend between the US and EAFE stock returns over the entire period. The graph shows that the correlation trends for 
the two sub-periods were significantly different. As hypothesized, the general trend of the correlation coefficient for 
the post-Asian financial crisis period was rising and approaching 0.90, while the trend for the pre-crisis period was 
only about 0.40. Correlation trends for all of the other developed market regional and individual country indices 
displayed a similar pattern of flat, highly volatile return correlation coefficients followed by a period of rising, less 
volatile co-movements after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
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Figure 1: Returns In International Developed Markets (U.S. Dollars), 1970-2004 
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Figure 2: Returns In The U.S. And International Emerging Markets (U.S. Dollars), 1988-2004 
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Table 3: Return Correlation Between U.S. And International Markets In US Dollars (Std. Deviations) 
Region or Country 1970 - 2004 1970 – 6/1997 7/1997 - 2004 
World ex US 49.79% (39.83%) 40.34% (39.76%) 84.46% (8.75%) *** ### 
EAFE 49.50% (42.28%) 40.67% (43.33%) 81.86% (11.32%) *** ### 
Europe 52.76% (39.98%) 45.38% (41.46%) 79.82% (14.95%) ** ## 
Pacific 35.48% (44.01%) 28.17% (45.70%) 62.29% (21.63%) ** ## 
United Kingdom 47.17% (40.77%) 38.61% (41.14%) 78.55% (17.40%) *** ## 
Germany 39.79% (48.27%) 30.81% (48.19%) 72.71% (31.24%) ** 
France 47.36% (41.69%) 39.68% (42.64%) 75.50% (20.94%) ** # 
Hong Kong 39.16% (45.67%) 34.35% (48.29%) 56.78% (28.01%) 
Japan 29.18% (43.78%) 24.48% (44.26%) 46.41% (37.18%) 
Australia 43.01% (40.51%) 36.87% (41.75%) 65.48% (25.01%) 
 1988 - 2004 1988 – June 1997 July 1997 - 2004 
World Emerging Markets 57.43% (33.81%) 41.87% (36.28%) 77.14% (15.11%) *** ## 
Emerging Markets - Asia 51.65% (39.65%) 36.67% (45.04%) 70.62% (18.70%) ** ## 
Emerging Markets -Europe 23.39% (40.36%) -1.41% (44.50%) 54.79% (25.72%) *** # 
Indonesia 30.86% (38.90%) 28.37% (41.86%) 34.00% (34.54%)  
Malaysia 36.00% (37.10%) 36.57% (40.32%) 35.27% (32.56%)  
Philippines 32.05% (42.78%) 28.30% (43.96%) 36.79% (40.74%)  
South Korea 32.05% (43.03%) 13.40% (42.37%) 55.66% (30.42%) ** 
Taiwan 29.73% (44.10%) 12.09% (45.97%) 52.08% (28.95%) ** 
Thailand 57.43% (45.28%) 41.87% (52.99%) 77.14% (26.36%) * # 
Turkey 39.04% (56.44%) 32.08% (64.87%) 59.62% (46.21) *  
 1993 - 2004 1993 – June 1997 July 1997 - 2004 
China 48.22% (30.51%) 41.73% (24.94%) 52.11% (32.80%) 
India 21.30% (42.32%) 12.69% (48.39%) 26.47% (37.27%) 
Poland 4.48% (64.19%) -33.89% (75.33%) 27.41% (57.27%) * 
  Significance of mean difference across sub-periods (* p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001).  Significance of differences between  
  variances across sub-periods (# p<.05    ## p<.01   ### p<.001) 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, globalization linked together many of the economies of the developed and emerging 
countries of the world. This has occurred in a number of different ways. More and more multi-national firms not only 
began to buy products in many different countries, but also set up manufacturing operations in various emerging 
countries. New world organizations have appeared, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and old ones have 
become more active such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Further, new treaties have been 
passed, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which have effectively opened individual country markets. Finally, new technologies, such as the 
Internet, have also contributed to the rapid integration of the world’s economies. 
 
What has not been clear from the outset is how the capital markets would perceive the economic integration. 
There are still political and cultural differences to be sure. However, the world appears to consist of many economic 
players and the question is who will win and who will lose. Would developed countries using their political power 
achieve an improved economic foothold from the integration or would emerging market countries with some 
economic advantages, such as lower labor costs and regulation, fare better in this new economic environment? 
 
The premise in this paper is that the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the events which followed were a 
defining moment with respect to how the equity markets viewed individual developed and emerging market countries. 
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Before 1997 the world may have been viewed as a “panacea” as evidenced by the higher equity market performance 
shown in Tables 1 and 2. Both for developed and emerging market countries as a whole as well as many individual 
countries, return performance was higher prior to 1997 than after the crisis. 
 
Figure 3: 24-Month Average Correlation Between U.S. And EAFE Returns (U.S. Dollars), 1970 – 2004 
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On the other hand, as reported in this paper, the return correlation of the individual country equity markets 
has changed significantly following the Asian crisis. As shown in Table 3, return correlations between countries was 
significantly smaller before 1997. This effect was not only true for developed countries but also for emerging market 
countries. It appears that the equity markets have grown more cautious regarding differences in performance across 
countries. In some sense, the individual country markets are being perceived more and more as one global market. We 
believe that the 1997 Asian crisis was a major contributing factor to this changed perception. In a very real sense it 
awoke investors to the fact that in a globalized economy, it may be more difficult for one player to outperform 
another. Thus, everyone does the same or at least moves in the same direction and the benefits of naïve diversification 
are diminished. This is the significant finding of this paper and this effect has been found for a broad range of 
international stock market indices as well as many individual country stock market indices. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines the question related to the perception that developed and emerging markets have been 
moving more in parallel with the U.S. stock market since the Asian financial crisis began in July 1997 and that the 
benefits of global diversification have diminished. This study observes that the low and volatile return correlations of 
about 0.40 in the pre-Asian crisis period have been replaced by higher and less volatile return co-movements of over 
0.85. Looking at various return indices of developed international regions and individual countries, this study found 
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significantly increased return correlation between the U.S. and international equity markets of developed countries 
since the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  
 
The MSCI data on emerging countries was also examined, however, the earliest data began in 1988 and 
many of the emerging countries returns were not available until the early-1990s. The analysis did show; however, that 
the correlations of the returns of the emerging markets with the US were, on average, higher during the post-crisis 
period approaching almost 0.80. These results were similar to those observed for developed countries.  
 
We believe that these findings have implications for U.S. and international portfolio managers who 
previously found considerable benefit from naïvely diversifying with foreign equity securities. Both emerging market 
and developed country equity indices have tracked more closely with the U.S. since July 1997. The implication is both 
obvious and alarming. Investments in international equities prior to the Asian crisis were an inexpensive and attractive 
means of reducing the variability of portfolio returns; however, this study suggests that the benefits have been 
significantly mitigated since the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  
 
The results reported in this paper suggest that investors and portfolio managers should not expect to naïvely 
receive the same benefits from international diversification that was obtained prior to the Asian financial crisis. 
Additionally, the potential to obtain large benefits from international diversification with the equities of emerging 
countries, in particular, have diminished. Additional research on the return correlations of individual countries and 
industry sectors might produce more encouraging results for portfolio managers. Finally, study into the possibility of a 
“China effect” influencing Pacific Rim regional returns should be conducted to determine the recent impact, if any, of 
this emerging economic giant on international return correlations.   
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NOTES 
 
